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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Lee Moi Chong appeals the District Court's denial of her 
habeas petition seeking relief from a final order of removal 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "Board"). Chong 
argues that the Board violated her due process rights, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the "INA"), and 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS") 
regulations in determining that she is ineligible for 
withholding of removal. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Chong, a Malaysian citizen, became a permanent resident 
of the United States in 1991. In May 1997, a federal district 
court convicted Chong of conspiracy to distribute heroin 
and possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 846 and 841(b). The district court 
sentenced Chong to time served, which amounted to two 
years imprisonment. The court departed downward from 
the minimum seventy-month sentence due to Chong's 
cooperation with the government. 
 
Based on Chong's drug convictions, the INS commenced 
removal proceedings. The INS claimed that it could remove 
Chong because her convictions constituted aggravated 
felonies and related to a controlled substance. See 8 U.S.C. 
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S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000); id. atS 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). In August 
1998, Chong conceded removeability and an immigration 
judge (the "IJ") ordered Chong deported to Malaysia. 
 
Chong subsequently filed a motion with the IJ requesting 
a hearing to determine her eligibility for withholding of 
removal. The INA provides that "the Attorney General may 
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General 
decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened 
in that country because of the alien's race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion." 8 U.S.C. S 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000). Chong 
claimed that the Malaysian government would prosecute 
her for her American drug convictions because she is ethnic 
Chinese. The government argued that Chong was ineligible 
for withholding of removal because her drug convictions 
constitute a "particularly serious crime." Id. at 
S 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). An exception to S 1231(b)(3)(A) applies if 
 
        the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of 
        a particularly serious crime[,] is a danger to the 
        community of the United States. . . . [A]n alien who has 
        been convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for 
        which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate 
        term of imprisonment of at least five years shall be 
        considered to have committed a particularly serious 
        crime. The previous sentence shall not preclude the 
        Attorney General from determining that, 
        notwithstanding the length of the sentence imposed, an 
        alien has been convicted of a particularly serious 
        crime. 
 
Id. at S 1231(b)(3)(B). 
 
After granting Chong a stay of removal, the IJ denied 
Chong an individualized hearing, reasoning that her drug 
convictions constitute per se "particularly serious crimes." 
The IJ certified his decision to the Board. Subsequently, the 
Board issued two opinions that hold that determining 
whether an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and 
sentenced to less than five years imprisonment has been 
convicted of a "particularly serious crime" requires an 
individualized examination of the nature of the conviction, 
the sentence imposed, and the circumstances and 
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underlying facts of the conviction. In re L-S-, Interim 
Decision 3386, 1999 WL 219344 (BIA Apr. 16, 1999); In re 
S-S-, Interim Decision 3374, 1999 WL 38822 (BIA Jan. 21, 
1999). Interpreting the Board's opinions to require an 
individualized hearing, the IJ sent a letter to the Board 
requesting it to remand Chong's case for a hearing. Chong 
also requested that the Board remand her case to the IJ so 
the IJ could make an individualized examination of her 
conviction. 
 
On July 12, 1998, the Board modified, but affirmed, the 
IJ's decision. The Board held that Chong was ineligible for 
withholding of removal because she had committed a 
"particularly serious crime." The Board noted that although 
Chong's two-year sentence is below the five-year term that 
the INA requires to be considered a per se "particularly 
serious crime," the district court departed from the 
minimum sentence due to Chong's assistance to the 
government. The Board stated: "This is different from a 
sentence reduction due to a minor role in the offense or 
other mitigating factors." The Board also examined the 
complaint against Chong and asserted that "over several 
years, [Chong] handled money derived from selling drugs 
and arranged telephonic connections for people involved in 
the conspiracy to promote the distribution of large amounts 
of heroin." Alternatively, the Board held that Chong failed 
to show that a return to Malaysia would threaten her 
freedom due to her Chinese ethnicity. 
 
Chong then filed a habeas petition in the District Court 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2241, arguing that the Board violated her 
due process rights and erred in determining that she was 
ineligible for withholding of removal. On September 3, 
1999, while Chong's habeas petition was pending in the 
District Court, the INS deported her to Malaysia. The 
District Court denied Chong's petition on February 29, 
2000. The District Court held that neither due process nor 
the INA required the Board to provide Chong with an 
individualized hearing to determine whether she committed 
a "particularly serious crime." The District Court also held 
that the Board did not violate Chong's due process rights 
because the Board: (1) provided Chong with adequate 
notice; (2) did not deprive Chong of an opportunity to be 
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heard; and (3) based its decision on a permissible 
interpretation of the INA under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).1 
Chong appeals, claiming that the Board violated (1) her due 
process rights, (2) the INA, and (3) INS regulations. 
 
II. 
 
A. Jurisdiction 
 
We initially must examine a number of jurisdictional 
issues to determine whether we can entertain Chong's 
appeal. First, the Supreme Court recently resolved a circuit 
split by holding that neither the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 nor the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 repeal 
district courts' jurisdiction to review aliens' habeas petitions 
filed under 28 U.S.C. S 2241(c). INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 
2271, 2287 (2001); accord Liang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308, 317 
(3d Cir. 2000). Second, S 2241(c)'s admonition that "habeas 
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless" the prisoner 
is "in custody" does not deprive us of jurisdiction to review 
Chong's petition. 28 U.S.C. S 2241(c) (2000). Chong filed 
her habeas petition on July 22, 1999. On September 3, 
1999, while Chong's petition was pending in the District 
Court, the INS deported her to Malaysia. The District Court 
denied Chong's petition on February 29, 2000. We hold 
that Chong is "in custody" within the meaning of S 2241(c) 
notwithstanding her removal, because we measure custody 
at the time Chong filed her petition. See Carafas v. 
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968); United States ex rel. 
Wojtycha v. Hopkins, 517 F.2d 420, 423 n.6 (3d Cir. 1975) 
("The `in-custody' jurisdictional requirement is determined 
as of the date the petition is filed in the district court."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court denied Chong's petition on the additional ground 
that "she waived a deportation proceeding as part of her plea bargain." 
Apparently, the District Court learned of this purported waiver from the 
government's pre-sentence report. The pre-sentence report is not part of 
the record, and the government seems to discount reliance upon it as a 
means of affirming the District Court. Since we find other grounds 
sufficient to uphold the District Court's decision, we need not 
investigate 
the alleged waiver. 
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Finally, we must determine whether an Article III,S 2 
case or controversy continues to exist despite Chong's 
deportation. Regardless of whether an Article III,S 2 case 
existed during the District Court proceedings, Chong must 
show the subsistence of a case or controversy in this Court. 
See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 
(1990). Although the parties did not raise the case or 
controversy issue in their original briefs, we must resolve 
the issue because it implicates our jurisdiction. See St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 537 (1978); 
Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 684 (3d Cir. 
1980) ("Inasmuch as mootness would divest us of 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal, we are obligated to 
address this issue as a threshold matter.") (footnote 
omitted). 
 
We acknowledge that we previously have suggested that 
it is within our discretion to consider a mootness question 
not raised by the parties. See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & 
Light Co. v. Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985) 
("As mootness is a jurisdictional question, we may consider 
it sua sponte.") (emphasis added). However, the Supreme 
Court has held that courts must decide Article III standing 
issues, even when not raised by the parties, before turning 
to the merits. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 
U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (stating that " `a court is bound to ask 
and answer [a jurisdictional question] for itself, even when 
not otherwise suggested' ") (citation omitted); see also Steele 
v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) 
("Although neither party argues that Steele's appeal is 
moot, we are required to raise issues of standing sua 
sponte if such issues exist."). Therefore, we proceed to 
examine whether Chong's deportation renders her appeal 
moot. 
 
Initially, we must address Chong's argument that we 
should entertain her appeal because we previously 
maintained jurisdiction over a deportee's habeas petition in 
Marrero v. INS, 990 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1993). In Marrero, 
this Court held that it would have jurisdiction to review a 
deportation order after the alien has been deported if the 
record revealed a colorable due process claim, despite the 
since repealed 8 U.S.C. S 1105a(c). Id.  at 777. However, 
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Marrero did not address whether an Article III case or 
controversy continued to exist after the alien's deportation. 
The Supreme Court has cautioned that "drive-by 
jurisdictional rulings of this sort . . . have no precedential 
effect." Steel, 523 U.S. at 91. Thus, we think our inquiry 
must extend beyond Marrero. 
 
Under Article III, S 2 of the United States Constitution, 
the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of 
a case or controversy. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 
316 (1974). In this case, Chong must show that her petition 
is not moot despite her deportation. Put another way, 
Chong must show that the standing she apparently had 
when she filed her habeas petition continues to exist now. 
See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 
397 (1980) (explaining that "mootness [is] the `doctrine of 
standing in a time frame. The requisite personal interest 
that must exist at the commencement of the litigation 
(standing) must continue throughout its existence 
(mootness).' ") (quoting Henry Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 
(1973)). Thus, Chong must show that she has suffered, or 
is threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the INS 
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See 
Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477. 
 
Even when a litigant is unable to meet the requirements 
of the general mootness inquiry, the litigant may invoke an 
exception to the mootness doctrine to gain judicial review. 
There are four exceptions to the mootness doctrine, so that 
a court will not dismiss a case as moot if: (1) secondary or 
"collateral" injuries survive after resolution of the primary 
injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition 
yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an 
allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; 
or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit. Artway v. 
Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1996). In this case, Chong contends that her petition 
presents a live case or controversy under the general 
mootness inquiry. Alternatively, Chong argues that 
sufficient collateral consequences flow from the Board's 
order of removal so that even though the INS already has 
deported her, we may entertain her appeal. 
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The Supreme Court has explained that "an incarcerated 
convict's (or a parolee's) challenge to the validity of his 
conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy 
requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction 
imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete 
injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by 
invalidation of the conviction." Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 
1, 7 (1998). However, after the convict's sentence expires, 
"some concrete and continuing injury other than the now- 
ended incarceration or parole--some `collateral 
consequence' of the conviction--must exist if the suit is to 
be maintained." Id. 
 
In Spencer, the Supreme Court held that insufficient 
collateral consequences resulted from the petitioner's parole 
revocation to avoid mootness. Id. at 14-17. In so holding, 
the Court criticized precedent that presumed the existence 
of collateral consequences and that accepted "the most 
generalized and hypothetical of consequences as sufficient 
to avoid mootness." Id. at 10. In particular, the Court 
criticized its decision in Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40 
(1968), where the Court held that the "mere `possibility' " of 
adverse collateral consequences is sufficient to preclude a 
finding of mootness. Id. at 55 (citation omitted). 
Nevertheless, the Spencer Court did not overrule Sibron, 
instead distinguishing it by noting that although a court 
may presume collateral consequences in the context of a 
criminal conviction, the same cannot be said of parole 
revocation. 523 U.S. at 12. 
 
This Court interpreted Spencer's collateral consequences 
analysis in Steele v. Blackman, where the INS deported the 
petitioner after he filed a habeas petition seeking reversal of 
the Board's determination that his drug convictions 
amounted to an aggravated felony. 236 F.3d at 132. In 
holding that the petitioner "alleged facts sufficient to show 
a continuing injury and serious collateral consequences," 
we stated: 
 
        Erroneous conviction of an aggravated felony will have 
        several continuing and serious legal consequences for 
        [the petitioner], including serving as a permanent bar 
        preventing his return to the United States to visit his 
        family. See 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(9)(A) (Supp. II 1996) 
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        (imposing a permanent bar on admissibility for 
        aggravated felons). A determination that [the 
        petitioner's] conviction did not constitute an aggravated 
        felony would alleviate many of these collateral effects. 
 
Id. at 134 n.4. 
 
We hold that sufficient collateral consequences flow from 
the Board's order of removal to make Chong's appeal a live 
case or controversy under Article III, S 2. Spencer rejects 
Chong's claim that the Board's order of removal creates 
sufficient collateral consequences by rendering her 
ineligible to return to the United States due to possible 
prosecution for felonious entry since Chong is " `able--and 
indeed required by law--to prevent such a possibility from 
occurring.' " Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15 (quoting Lane v. 
Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1982)). However, the INA 
provides, in relevant part, that an alien who has been 
ordered removed "and who seeks admission within 10 years 
of the date of such alien's departure or removal . .. is 
inadmissible." 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2000). Thus, the 
Board's order of removal creates sufficient collateral 
consequences to render Chong's petition a live case or 
controversy by preventing her from entering the United 
States for ten years. See Tapia Garcia v. INS , 237 F.3d 
1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the deportee's 
"inability to reenter and reside legally in the United States 
with his family is a collateral consequence of his 
deportation because it is clearly imposed as a matter of 
law"); Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 
2000), vacated on other grounds, 121 S. Ct. 2585 (2001) 
(holding that the alien's deportation did not render his 
habeas petition moot because "he cannot be admitted into 
the United States within ten years of the date of his 
removal"). But see United States v. Mercurris , 192 F.3d 290, 
294 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding moot the deportee's habeas 
petition challenging the district court's finding that his 
marijuana convictions rendered him an aggravated felon 
since the deportee's controlled substance conviction 
prohibited him from entering the United States in the 
following ten years, regardless of his alleged status as an 
aggravated felon); Diaz v. Duckworth, 143 F.3d 345, 346-48 
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the petitioner's deportation 
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mooted his habeas petition seeking reinstatement of"good- 
time" credit and stating, in dicta, that "[w]hatever is left of 
Sibron is too little for a deportee to invoke, even if the 
deportee is complaining about a conviction, and not a 
parole revocation, like Spencer, or a prison disciplinary 
sanction, like Diaz"); cf. Hose v. INS, 180 F.3d 992, 996 
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that the deportation of 
the alien rendered her habeas petition seeking a stay of 
deportation moot). 
 
We recognize that Steele does not necessarily compel our 
holding because of the different factual scenarios 
presented. In Steele, the petitioner challenged the Board's 
determination that he committed an aggravated felony. 136 
F.3d at 132. The INA bars aggravated felons from entering 
the United States for ten years. 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). 
Thus, a determination that the Steele petitioner's conviction 
did not constitute an aggravated felony could allow the 
petitioner to reenter the United States. 
 
By contrast, Chong does not contest the Board's finding 
that she committed an aggravated felony. Therefore, the 
Board's unchallenged finding that Chong committed an 
aggravated felony would bar Chong from reentering the 
United States. Moreover, if we reversed the Board's finding 
that Chong committed a "particularly serious crime," it 
seemingly would be too late for the Attorney General to 
withhold removal, since Chong already has been deported. 
Nevertheless, we suppose that, were we to reverse the 
Board's decision, the Attorney General could exercise his 
discretion and grant "withholding" of removal and allow 
Chong to reenter the United States. Accordingly, we hold 
that Chong's inability to reenter the United States for ten 
years after her deportation is a sufficient collateral 
consequence stemming from the Board's order of removal to 
render Chong's petition justiciable under Article III, S 2. 
 
B. The Merits 
 
Turning to the merits of the appeal, Chong argues that 
the Board violated (1) her due process rights, (2) the INA, 
and (3) INS regulations. We address these arguments in 
turn. 
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1. Did the Board's Actions Comply with Due Process? 
 
Chong claims that the Board violated her due process 
rights by not giving her notice that it would decide whether 
she committed a "particularly serious crime" without 
remanding to the IJ and by not providing her with an 
opportunity to be heard on the "particularly serious crime" 
issue. We review de novo whether the Board violated 
Chong's due process rights. See Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 
F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 
Aliens facing removal are entitled to due process. 
Chlomos v. United States Dep't of Justice, INS, 516 F.2d 
310, 313 (3d Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has observed: 
 
        We are dealing here with procedural requirements 
        prescribed for the protection of the alien. Though 
        deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it 
        visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives 
        him of the right to stay and live and work in this land 
        of freedom. That deportation is a penalty--at times a 
        most serious one--cannot be doubted. Meticulous care 
        must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is 
        deprived of that liberty not meet the essential 
        standards of fairness. 
 
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)."The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity 
to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.' " Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) 
(citation omitted). Specifically, due process requires that 
Chong: (1) be entitled to factfinding based on a record 
produced before the Board and disclosed to her; (2) be 
allowed to make arguments on her own behalf; and (3) have 
the right to an individualized determination of her interests. 
See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
Chong contends that the Board violated her due process 
rights by affirming the IJ's decision without remanding to 
the IJ for an individualized hearing. We disagree. An 
individual's due process right to be heard does not ensure 
a hearing in all contexts, as such a requirement"would 
grind judicial and administrative gears to a screeching 
halt." Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 60 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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Instead, administrative bodies can preserve an individual's 
due process right to be heard in many different ways. Id. 
 
In this case, Chong received a live hearing before the IJ, 
at which point she was afforded the opportunity to argue 
that her drug convictions did not rise to the level of 
"particularly serious crimes," and to present evidence to the 
IJ supporting her position. The IJ created a record of the 
proceedings, which was then transmitted to the Board for 
review. In deciding that Chong had committed a 
"particularly serious crime," the Board looked at the 
specific facts of Chong's case--engaging in the 
"individualized determination" that Abdulai requires--rather 
than blindly following a categorical rule, i.e., that all drug 
convictions qualify as "particularly serious crimes." 239 
F.3d at 549. Due process requires no more. See id. at 549- 
50; see also Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 903-04 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that once an alien receives a full and fair 
hearing in front of an IJ, due process is satisfied). 
 
Holding otherwise would give Chong the proverbial 
"second bite at the apple." Once an alien has had a chance 
to offer evidence and raise arguments on the "particularly 
serious crime" issue during a removal proceeding, we can 
see no persuasive reason for requiring that she receive a 
second hearing on the question. Nor do we think that due 
process necessitates such a redundant procedural 
measure. 
 
Chong also argues that the Board violated her due 
process rights by not giving her the opportunity to submit 
evidence to the Board. In fact, the Board did not prevent 
Chong from submitting evidence relevant to the 
"particularly serious crime" analysis. However, since Chong 
believed that the Board would remand her case to the IJ for 
a hearing, Chong did not submit any evidence to the Board. 
Perhaps the Board should have provided notice to Chong 
that it would decide the "particularly serious crime" issue 
without remanding to the IJ, thereby indicating to Chong 
that she should submit any evidence she wished to be 
considered. But the Board's failure to provide notice to 
Chong does not constitute a due process violation. Chong 
had the opportunity to present any evidence concerning the 
"particularly serious crime" determination to the IJ, and the 
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Board had the administrative record before it when 
deciding Chong's appeal. This procedure satisfies due 
process. See Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 549-50; see also Ladha, 
215 F.3d at 903-04 (holding that once an alien receives a 
full and fair hearing in front of an IJ, due process is 
satisfied). 
 
2. Did the Board Err in Interpreting the INA? 
 
Chong argues that the Board violated 8 U.S.C. 
S 1231(b)(3)(B) by not granting her an individualized 
hearing to determine whether she committed a "particularly 
serious crime." We accord Chevron deference to the Board's 
interpretation of the INA. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 
415, 424 (1999). Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to 
determining whether the INA is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to what constitutes a "particularly serious crime," 
and, if so, whether the Board's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of S 1231(b)(3)(B). See Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
 
The INA is silent concerning how the Board should 
determine whether an alien has committed a "particularly 
serious crime" when a court has convicted the alien of an 
aggravated felony for which the court sentenced the alien to 
less than five years imprisonment. The statute simply notes 
that the Attorney General is not precluded "from 
determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence 
imposed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime." 8 U.S.C. S 1231(b)(3)(B). In other words, 
where a court has sentenced an alien to less than five years 
for an aggravated felony, the statute grants the Attorney 
General discretion to determine whether that alien has 
committed a "particularly serious crime." 
 
The Board has explained that when determining whether 
a crime is "particularly serious," 
 
        consideration of the individual facts and circumstances 
        is appropriate . . . This inquiry does not involve an 
        examination of the respondents' family or community 
        ties, or the risk of persecution in the alien's native 
        country. To make this determination, we look to the 
        conviction records and sentencing information. 
 
                                13 
  
        Further, we do not engage in a retrial of the alien's 
        criminal case or go behind the record of conviction to 
        redetermine the alien's innocence or guilt. 
 
In re L-S-, Interim Decision 3386, 1999 WL 219344 (BIA 
Apr. 16, 1999). As this language demonstrates, In re L-S- 
simply requires that an individualized examination or 
determination of the "particularly serious crime" issue be 
conducted, not that an individualized hearing be held. We 
conclude that the Board's interpretation of S 1231(b)(3)(B) is 
reasonable because it guides and channels the Attorney 
General's discretion to determine whether an alien like 
Chong has committed a "particularly serious crime," 
thereby helping to ensure that the Attorney General does 
not make this determination in an arbitrary or inconsistent 
manner. 
 
Moreover, we conclude that the Board's interpretation of 
S 1231(b)(3)(B) as necessitating only an individualized 
examination of the "particularly serious crime" issue, rather 
than an individualized hearing, is a permissible one. As we 
noted supra in Part II.B.1., when an alien already has been 
provided the opportunity to mount arguments and present 
evidence on the "particularly serious crime" question during 
a live removal hearing, due process does not require a 
second hearing on the issue. All that the Constitution 
mandates is an "individualized determination," which the 
Board's construction affords. Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 549. 
Thus, we reject Chong's argument that the Board violated 
S 1231(b)(3)(B). 
 
To the extent that Chong contends that the Board 
violated its precedent by not conducting an individualized 
determination of her case, we disagree. In fact, the Board 
did conduct an independent determination of the facts and 
circumstances of Chong's case. The Board noted that 
although Chong's two-year sentence was below the five-year 
term that requires an aggravated felony to be considered a 
per se "particularly serious crime," the district court 
departed from the minimum sentence due to Chong's 
assistance to the INS. The Board stated: "This is different 
from a sentence reduction due to a minor role in the 
offense or other mitigating factors." The Board examined 
the complaint against Chong and asserted that "over 
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several years, [Chong] handled money derived from selling 
drugs and arranged telephonic connections for people 
involved in the conspiracy to promote the distribution of 
large amounts of heroin." This examination of the record 
and sentencing information is all that Board precedent 
requires. 
 
3. Did the Board Violate INS Regulations? 
 
Finally, Chong claims that the Board violated S 3.7 of the 
INS regulations. In this case, the IJ certified his decision to 
the Board. When an IJ knows at the time he issues a 
decision that he will certify the case to the Board, as is the 
case here, the INS regulations require the IJ to provide a 
Notice of Certification. 8 C.F.R. S 3.7 (2001). The 
regulations further require that the Notice of Certification 
"inform the parties that they have the right to make 
representations before the Board, including the making of 
a request for oral argument and the submission of a brief." 
Id. In this case, the Notice of Certification did not inform 
Chong that she could "make representations before the 
Board." Id. 
 
"[O]ur standard of review is even more deferential when 
an agency is interpreting a regulation rather than a statute 
that it administers." Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 552. An agency's 
interpretation of its own regulation is "controlling . . . 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation." Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 414 (1945). The government, although acknowledging 
that the Notice of Certification did not provide Chong with 
the notice that S 3.7 requires, points out that the INS 
regulations state that the "Board in its discretion may 
review any such case by certification without regard to the 
provisions of S 3.7 if it determines that the parties have 
already been given a fair opportunity to make 
representations before the Board regarding the case, 
including the opportunity [to] request oral argument and to 
submit a brief." 8 C.F.R. S 3.1(c). The government notes 
that Chong filed a memorandum with the IJ in which she 
argued that her convictions did not preclude her from 
qualifying for withholding of removal. This evidence was 
part of the administrative record before the Board when it 
decided Chong's appeal. Therefore, the government 
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concludes, the Board could have determined, underS 3.1(c), 
that Chong already had been given a fair opportunity to 
make representations before the Board. We disagree. 
 
The Board could not have determined that Chong had the 
opportunity to make representations "before the Board" 
because at the time the IJ certified his decision, Chong had 
not submitted any documents to the Board. The INA 
defines the "Board" as "the Board of Immigration Appeals," 
and has a separate definition for "immigration judge." 8 
C.F.R. S 1.1(e) (2001); id. at S 1.1(l). Thus, we cannot 
consider documents Chong submitted to the IJ to be 
"representations before the Board." Id.  at S 3.7. Accordingly, 
the IJ violated S 3.7 by not informing Chong that she could 
"make representations before the Board, including the 
making of a request for oral argument and the submission 
of a brief." Id. 
 
However, we hold that to warrant reversal, the S 3.7 
violation must have prejudiced Chong. "[A]n agency's failure 
to afford an individual safeguard required under its own 
regulations may result in the invalidation of the ultimate 
administrative determination," even if the regulation is not 
constitutionally mandated. United States v. Morgan, 193 
F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Service v. Dulles, 
354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) ("While it is of course true that 
. . . , the Secretary was not obligated to impose upon 
himself these more rigorous substantive and procedural 
standards, . . . having done so he could not, so long as the 
Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard 
to them."). This principle is rooted in the doctrine originated 
in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy , 347 U.S. 
260 (1954), where the Supreme Court vacated a Board 
deportation order because the procedures leading to the 
order failed to comply with INS regulations. Id.  at 267. 
Although the Accardi doctrine originally contemplated that 
an agency's failure to comply with its own rules 
automatically would nullify its actions, the Supreme Court 
since has "required that claimants demonstrate prejudice 
resulting from the violation unless `[t]he rules were not 
intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits 
upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered 
discretion' or unless `an agency required by rule to exercise 
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independent discretion has failed to do so.' " Morgan, 193 
F.3d at 267 (quoting American Farm Lines v. Black Ball 
Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1970)). 
 
In Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1994), the 
Second Circuit rejected the habeas petitioner's request to 
reverse the Board when the IJ did not provide the petitioner 
with a Notice of Certification under S 3.7. The court stated 
that 
 
        when a regulation is promulgated to protect a 
        fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a 
        federal statute, and the INS fails to adhere to it, the 
        challenged deportation proceeding is invalid and a 
        remand to the agency is required . . . . On the other 
        hand, where an INS regulation does not affect 
        fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or a 
        federal statute, we believe it is best to invalidate a 
        challenged proceeding only upon a showing of 
        prejudice to the rights sought to be protected by the 
        subject regulation. 
 
17 F.3d at 518.2 The court then turned to decide whether 
fundamental rights with constitutional or federal statutory 
origins are implicated by S 3.7's admonition that "[i]f it is 
known at the time the initial decision is made that the case 
will be certified, the notice of such certification shall be 
included in such decision." 8 C.F.R. S 3.7. The Waldron 
Court held that S 3.7 does not implicate a fundamental 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In reaching its conclusion that some violations of INS regulations 
require reversal without necessitating a showing of prejudice, a majority 
of the Waldron panel rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach of "requir[ing] 
a demonstration of prejudice irrespective of whether the subject 
regulation was designed to protect a fundamental right derived from the 
Constitution or a federal statute." 17 F.3d at 518 (citing United States 
v. 
Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979)). Judge Walker's 
concurring opinion disagreed with the majority's analysis and instead 
argued that when the Board violates an INS regulation, the petitioner 
always must show that the violation caused prejudice. Waldron, 17 F.3d 
at 519-21 (Walker, J., concurring). We need not express an opinion 
regarding this dispute due to our holding that S 3.7 does not implicate 
a fundamental constitutional or statutory right. Thus, even under the 
"stricter" approach of the Waldron majority, the S 3.7 violation must have 
prejudiced Chong to warrant reversal. 
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constitutional or statutory right, as it primarily addresses 
the procedure for notifying an alien that the case is being 
certified to the Board. 17 F.3d at 518. 
 
We agree with the Second Circuit that S 3.7 is"not 
grounded in any underlying fundamental constitutional or 
statutory right." Id. As the Second Circuit noted, S 3.7 
simply "addresses the procedure for notifying an alien that 
the case is being certified to the [Board.]" Id. Thus, the S 3.7 
violation must have prejudiced Chong to warrant reversal. 
 
Chong argues that the IJ's failure to provide her with 
notice that she could make representations before the 
Board prejudiced her because, had she been given the 
opportunity to present evidence to the Board, she would 
have submitted the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, 
which states that Chong was a "minor participant" in the 
heroin scheme. Additionally, Chong claims that she would 
have produced several witnesses who would have testified 
to the basis by which the prosecuting authorities found 
that she was a minor participant. But since Chong fails to 
address the Board's alternate holding that she does not 
have a valid claim for withholding of removal, we hold that 
the S 3.7 violation did not prejudice Chong. 
 
Before the IJ, Chong conceded that her drug convictions 
constituted aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000) (defining "aggravated felony," in part, 
as "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance. . . , 
including a drug trafficking crime"). Since the INA provides 
that an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is 
deportable, the IJ correctly found Chong subject to 
removeability. See id. at S 1227(a)(2)(iii). 
 
Chong sought to avoid deportation by requesting 
withholding of removal. The INA prohibits the Attorney 
General from removing an alien if he "decides that the 
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country 
because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion." Id. at S 1231(b)(3)(A). Chong claimed that the 
Malaysian government would threaten her freedom by 
prosecuting her for her American drug crimes because of 
her Chinese ethnicity. The Board rejected Chong's claim, 
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holding that she "does not have a valid claim for 
withholding of removal because she merely fears a 
subsequent prosecution in Malaysia due to her drug 
trafficking offense in the United States. [Chong] has not 
shown that any such prosecution would include elements 
of persecution because she is ethnic Chinese." Chong does 
not contest this holding on appeal. 
 
Instead, Chong claims that the Board erred in holding 
that she committed a "particularly serious crime." But by 
focusing on the Board's determination that she committed 
a "particularly serious crime," rather than on the Board's 
holding that her freedom would not be threatened in 
Malaysia due to her Chinese ethnicity, Chong puts the cart 
before the horse. Chong must show that the Board erred in 
determining that her freedom would not be threatened in 
Malaysia due to her Chinese ethnicity before demonstrating 
that the exception for aliens who commit "particularly 
serious crimes" does not pertain to deny her withholding of 
removal. Thus, even though the IJ violated S 3.7, Chong's 
failure to contest the Board's finding that her freedom 
would not be threatened in Malaysia due to her Chinese 
ethnicity requires us to hold that this violation did not 
prejudice her. See In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 879 F.2d 
987, 989-90 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (affirming because 
the appellant challenged only one of two alternate bases for 
the bankruptcy court's decision, "for whatever we might 
decide about [one basis for the bankruptcy court's decision] 
could in no way affect the correctness of the bankruptcy 
court's denial of relief "); MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 542 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 
III. 
 
We have jurisdiction to hear Chong's habeas petition 
because the Board's order of removal creates collateral 
consequences that render her appeal a live case or 
controversy under Article III. The Board has not violated 
Chong's due process rights or the INA. Although the IJ did 
violate INS regulations, this violation did not prejudice 
Chong. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court's denial 
of Chong's petition. 
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